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I. INTRODUCTION
In the common law system of evidence, logically relevant evidence
is presumptively admissible.2 The logical relevance of an item of evi-
dence, however, does not guarantee its admission. The common law has
developed a number of rules that exclude logically relevant evidence. In
some cases, the common law excludes evidence because of doubts about
the credibility or reliability of that type of evidence. For example, the
best evidence rule rests primarily on skepticism about the trustworthi-
ness of secondary evidence concerning a document's contents.- When
the issue is the content of a document, the common law prefers that the
document itself be produced in court, because the production of the
document is obviously the most reliable method of establishing its con-
tents. The common law enforces this preference by excluding other evi-
dence of the document's contents, such as oral testimony describing the
document, unless there is an adequate excuse for the nonproduction of
the document. In other cases, the common law excludes evidence to
promote a social policy. The common-law privileges for confidential re-
lationships are illustrative. For example, the attorney-client privilege
often bars the admission of relevant, trustworthy evidence in order to
encourage the flow of information between client and attorney.4
The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on June 1, 1975.5
The Rules are now in effect not only in federal court, but also in the
thirty-one states that have adopted evidence codes patterned after the
Federal Rules.6 While the Federal Rules codify most of the common-
law exclusionary rules of evidence, the Rules omit others. For example,
almost all jurisdictions require that a prosecutor corroborate any con-
fession by the defendant.' In order to introduce a defendant's confes-
sion, the prosecutor must present independent, corroborating evidence
that a criminal act has occurred. The rationale for the corroboration
requirement is doubt about the credibility of confession evidence; con-
fessions are sometimes coerced, and even when there is no police coer-
cion, an innocent person may have an ulterior motive or psychological
2. 1 J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 264-66 (1898).
3. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 229-230 (3d ed. 1984).
4. Id. § 87.
5. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
6. See generally 3 G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA. THE FEDERAL RULES IN
THE STATES (1987); 4 G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, supra.
7. See, e.g., Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 92-93 (1954) (exploring lower court split);
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954); United States v. Wilson, 529 F.2d 913, 915 (10th
Cir. 1976); Hagie, The Operation, Legal Basis and Purpose of the Corpus Delecti Rule in Califor-
nia Criminal Law, 15 LINCOLN L. REv. 53 (1984).
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compulsion to confess to a crime., The corroboration requirement is one
of the common-law doctrines omitted from the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.9 In other jurisdictions, as a matter of decisional law the courts
decided to exclude generally any statements made by a defendant dur-
ing plea bargaining.10 These courts did so to further the social policy of
encouraging plea bargaining, which eases the burden on the criminal
justice system. 1 Under this case law doctrine, if the police questioned
the defendant and the defendant reasonably believed that he could bar-
gain for concessions during the questioning, the defendant's statement
to the police might be excludible.12 Like the corroboration rule, how-
ever, this doctrine has been omitted from the Federal Rules; the only
exclusionary rule recognized by the Federal Rules is restricted to "plea
discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority .... is
The question naturally arises: Have these uncodified exclusionary
doctrines survived despite the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence? In a series of articles, 4 the Author has argued that the Federal
Rules operate much like a self-contained, civil-law code,' 5 abolishing
common-law rules that Congress failed to codify. The basis for this ar-
gument is Federal Rule of Evidence 402, which reads: "All relevant evi-
dence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."'"
Like the common law, the main clause of rule 402 indicates that logi-
cally relevant evidence is presumptively admissible. The exceptive lan-
guage that follows indicates that relevant evidence may be excluded on
the basis of one of the listed sources of law. The list, however, omits
8. See generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) [hereinafter WICKERSHAm REPORT].
9. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5200 (1978).
10. E. CLEARY, supra note 3, § 274.
11. Id.
12. Suppose that the defendant was charged with a property crime and that during police
interrogation the defendant made a statement tending to show his guilt of the offense. Because of
this exclusionary doctrine, at a related civil trial for conversion the plaintiff might be unable to
offer the statement against the defendant.
13. FED. R. Evm. 410(4).
14. See Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV. LrrIGA-
TION 129 (1987) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402]; Imwinkelried, The
Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465 (1985) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend]; Im-
winkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning
the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577 (1984) [hereinafter Im-
winkelried, Judge versus Jury].
15. See Pk SCHLESINGER, ComPARATVE LAW: CASES, MATERLLS, TEXT 281-82 (4th ed. 1980)
(describing the operation of a civil-law code).
16. FED. R. EVID. 402.
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any mention of case or decisional law. This omission suggests that rule
402 deprives the judiciary of the common-law power to prescribe exclu-
sionary rules of evidence, and the legislative history of rule 402 confirms
that suggestion.'
The United States Supreme Court appears to have embraced this
conception of the Federal Rules. In 1984 the Court, in United States v.
Abel,'8 considered whether bias impeachment is permissible under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Article VI of the Federal Rules, devoted to
impeachment, does not enumerate bias as one of the modes of impeach-
ment. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that bias impeachment is ac-
ceptable under the Federal Rules. Although that conclusion is hardly
remarkable, the Court's reasoning is significant. The Court pointed out
that evidence of bias is logically relevant to the witness' credibility and
added that "[r]ule 402 provides that all relevant 'evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the United States Constitution, by Act
of Congress, or by applicable rule."' 9 The Court quoted approvingly an
article written by Professor Edward Cleary, Reporter for the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules, 0 which asserted that "[i]n principle,
under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains."'21
More recently, in Bourjaily v. United States,2 2 the Court reaf-
firmed this conception of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Bourjaily,
the Court considered whether the prosecution may "bootstrap" to sat-
isfy the foundation for the coconspirator hearsay exception; that is,
whether the prosecution could use the contents of the coconspirator's
statement to prove the existence of a conspiracy. In two pre-Federal
Rule cases, Glasser v. United States23 and United States v. Nixon,24
the Court had prohibited bootstrapping. The defense in Bourjaily
urged the Court to hold that the common-law prohibition survived be-
cause the Federal Rules "evidenced no intent to disturb the bootstrap-
ping rule .... ,,25 The defense argued that the common-law rule that
allowed bootstrapping was so well settled that it should survive the
adoption of the Federal Rules, "without affirmative evidence... indi-
cating" Congress' intent to abolish the rule.2" Writing for the majority,
17. See Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402, supra note 14, at 130-38.
18. 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
19. Id. at 51.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L.
REv. 908, 915 (1978)).
22. 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
23. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
24. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
25. Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2780.
26. Id.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected that argument.2 7
If the Federal Rules function as a self-contained, civil-law code and
implicitly abolish uncodified rules, the judiciary has lost its common-
law power to formulate exclusionary rules of evidence. Unless they can
point to a basis for exclusion in the Constitution, a statute, or court rule
adopted pursuant to statutory authority, judges can no longer preclude
the admission of relevant evidence. Thus, logically relevant evidence
generally is admissible even when the judge doubts the credibility of
the source of the evidence, and even when the exclusion might serve an
extrinsic social policy. While excluding relevant evidence for either rea-
son might be well intentioned, rule 402 takes that power away from
federal judges.
This conception of the Federal Rules understandably is unsettling
to commentators and judges schooled in the common law of evidence.
In this "Age of Statutes,"" some yearn-almost nostalgically-to re-
turn to the common law of yesteryear.29 Commentators have argued
that particular common-law rules have survived the adoption of the
Federal Rules,30 and courts have continued to enforce common-law re-
strictions on the admission of relevant evidence that are nowhere codi-
fied in the Federal Rules. 1 To justify the continued use of these
common-law rules, commentators and courts often point to Federal
Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 authorizes the trial judge to balance the
probative value of an item of evidence against its attendant probative
dangers, and to exclude relevant evidence when the dangers substan-
tially outweigh the probative value. Rule 403 states: "Although [logi-
cally] relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."32 If the
27. The Court found that evidence of congressional intent would only confirm the plain
meaning of Rule 104, which "on its face allows the trial judge to consider any evidence whatsoever,
bound only by the rules of privilege." Id.
28. See generally G. CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
29. Hetzel, Instilling Legislative Interpretation Skills in the Classroom and the Courtroom,
48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 663, 667-69 (1987).
30. E.g., Langum, Uncodified Federal Evidence Rules Applicable to Civil Trials, 19 WLLAM-
ErrE L. REV. 513 (1983) [hereinafter Langum, Uncodified Federal Evidence Rules]; Langum, The
Hidden Rules of Evidence: Michigan's Uncodified Evidence Law, 61 MiCH. B.J. 320 (1982) [herein-
after Langum, The Hidden Rules].
31. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 1-5 to 1-6 (1986). Scientific
Evidence noted that the common-law test for the admissibility of scientific evidence was the Frye
standard, requiring the proponent of establish general acceptance of the scientific technique in
question. Although the Federal Rules do not expressly incorporate any "general acceptance" lan-
guage, most courts have continued to adhere to Frye.
32. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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expression "probative value" includes the credibility of the source of
the evidence, under rule 403 a judge may exclude relevant evidence
when he doubts its reliability. Similarly, if "prejudice" includes injury
to an extrinsic social policy, the rule enables a judge to bar relevant
evidence to effect that policy. In short, rule 403 might empower a judge
to resurrect the common law that rule 402 apparently abolished.
The thesis of this Article is that, in order to reconcile rule 403 with
rule 402, rule 403 must be construed narrowly. Part II of this Article
argues that the language "probative value" in rule 403 does not author-
ize the trial judge to exclude evidence because of doubts about the
credibility of the source of the evidence. Part III contends that the
"prejudice" prong of rule 403 permits a judge to exclude relevant evi-
dence only when the evidence poses a risk to the integrity of the fact-
finding process. Rule 403 does not authorize a judge to bar relevant evi-
dence in pursuit of an extrinsic social policy, such as the encouragement
of plea bargaining. Finally, Part IV concludes that rule 403 should be
interpreted restrictively, to carry out the legislative intent of both rule
402 and 403 and to prevent judicial usurpation of the power of the juror
and the legislator.
II. THE PROBATIVE VALUE SIDE OF THE RULE 403 BALANCE: MAY A
TRIAL JUDGE EXCLUDE LOGICALLY RELEVANT EVIDENCE BECAUSE OF
DOUBT ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SOURCE OF THE EVIDENCE?
At first blush, the wording of federal rule 403 appears to support
the contention that the rule authorizes a judge to consider the credibil-
ity of the source of evidence. Rules 401 and 402 use the adjective "rele-
vant.""3 In contrast, rule 403 employs the language "probative value,
'3 4
which admittedly is ambiguous, 5 but arguably denotes a concept
broader than bare logical relevance."8 The difficulty is defining the
breadth of "probative value."
Courts and commentators agree that the concept of probative value
allows the trial judge to consider at least three elements in balancing
under rule 403. First, a judge may consider the facial vagueness" or
uncertainty8 of the proposed testimony. When the weakness of testi-
33. FED. R. Evm. 401-402.
34. FED. R. Evm. 403.
35. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5214, at 269.
36. See Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220, 234 (1976).
37. United States v. Maestas, 554 F.2d 834, 836 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972
(1977).
38. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1255-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (con-
tending that, on its face, the proposed expert testimony was speculative); Knight v. State, 635
S.W.2d 650, 652 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that the witness was uncertain).
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mony is evident on its face, a judge certainly should be permitted to
consider that weakness. Second, a judge may consider the number of
intermediate propositions between the item of evidence and the ulti-
mate consequential fact that the item is offered to prove.39 The larger
the number of intermediate inferences the jury must draw, the greater
the probability that the jury will commit some inferential error.40 This
element comes into play when the evidence is circumstantial. 1 Consider
the following illustration:
Duncan is on trial for the April 1 murder of Mr. Wilson. The prosecutor offers into
evidence an authenticated love letter written by Duncan and mailed to Mrs. Wilson
in January of the same year. The defense's objection is lack of relevancy to guilt.
... As Professor Morgan has pointed out,. . . the trier of fact would have to take
at least five inferential steps to connect Duncan as author of the love letter to
Duncan as the killer of Mr. Wilson. The implicit chain of reasoning might go some-
thing like this: (1) From the expression in the letter we infer Duncan's love of Mrs.
Wilson; (2) from that we infer Duncan's desire for exclusive possession of Mrs. Wil-
son; (3) from that we reason that Duncan's wish was to get rid of Mr. Wilson; (4)
from that the inference is to the formation of a plan to kill Mr. Wilson and (5)
finally to Duncan's probable execution of the plan by killing Mr. Wilson. 2
In deciding whether to admit this evidence, a judge may consider the
length of the chain of inference.43 Finally, a judge may consider the
strength of the inference from the evidence to the consequential fact
that it is offered to prove." Suppose that in the above hypothetical
Duncan had written the letter several years before the homicide. The
remoteness in time lowers the probative value of the evidence.4 Re-
moteness in place can have the same effect.46 Whenever the item of evi-
dence is removed in space or time from the events alleged in the
pleadings, the removal creates the possibility of intervening events,
such as Mrs. Wilson's affair with another man, which reduce the proba-
tive value of the evidence.
The common denominator of these elements is that a judge can
evaluate them by considering the evidence on its face. Assume, for ex-
ample, that a witness testifies, "I had a conversation with Duncan five
years ago, and I've got a vague recollection that during the conversation
39. See Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. Rv. 385,
388 (1952).
40. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5214, at 271.
41. Id. § 5213, at 259-60.
42. Schmertz, Relevancy and Its Policy Counterweights: A Brief Excursion Through Article
IV of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 1, 2-3 (1974).
43. Id. at 3.
44. See M. GRAHAm, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.1, at 180 (2d ed. 1986).
45. See Dolan, supra note 36, at 263.
46. Id.
47. See Weinstein & Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 4 G& L. REv. 43, 57 (1969).
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he said that he'd fallen in love with a woman named Wiret or Wilson or
some name like that." The uncertainty of the testimony, the length of
the chain of intermediate inferences, and the remoteness in time are
obvious on the face of the testimony. A consensus exists that a judge
may consider these elements in assessing probative value under rule
403.
The consensus ends, however, when a trial judge attempts to go
beyond the face of the evidence to consider the credibility of the source
of the evidence. Some commentators argue that a judge has that power.
One commentator, for example, contends that in balancing under rule
403, a judge should consider whether the source of the evidence has
been impeached.48 Some courts have embraced this contention. In ap-
plying rule 403, one court stressed that the evidence in question had
been impeached by inconsistent testimony.49 Another court has indi-
cated that in administering rule 403 a judge may consider whether the
evidence has been corroborated.50 Still another court has held that the
trial judge properly excluded expert testimony under rule 403 because
there was powerful evidence of the expert's bias and the testimony was
utterly lacking in credibility.51
The prevailing view, however, is to the contrary. Leading law re-
view commentators 52 and treatise writers 53 have concluded that a judge
may not consider the credibility of the source of the evidence in gauging
probative value under rule 403. Likewise, the overwhelming majority of
courts asserts that a judge cannot pass on credibility in assessing proba-
tive value.5 This majority view is better reasoned than the minority
48. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: A Sliding
Scale of Proof, 59 NoTRE DAmE L. RE V. 556, 589 (1984).
49. Pollard v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 598 F.2d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
917 (1979). Pollard is criticized in 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5214, at 231.
50. United States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923
(1981).
51. United States v. Davis, 772 F.2d 1339, 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1036 (1985);
see also People v. Brown, 111 Cal. App. 3d 523, 168 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1980). Brown is criticized in 22
C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5214, at 231.
52. See, e.g., Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C.
DAVIs L. Rav. 59, 67 (1984); Trautman, supra note 39, at 387.
53. See, e.g., 3 D. LoUISELL & C. MuELEM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 252, at 18-19 (1979); 22 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, §§ 5162, 5213-14.
54. See United States v. Castello, 830 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gardea Car-
rasco, 830 F.2d 41, 44 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[i]t is the sole province of the jury ... to
assess the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses ... [w]e cannot declare testi-
mony incredible as a matter of law unless it is 'so unbelievable on its face that it defies physical
laws' "); United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that the judge could
not exclude evidence simply because it was self-serving); United States v. Welsh, 774 F.2d 670, 672
(4th Cir. 1985) (stating that "as a general rule, the credibility of a witness has nothing to do with
whether or not his testimony is probative ... the law does not consider credibility as a compo-
nent" of probative value); United States v. Pinalto, 771 F.2d 457, 459 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that
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rule. In the American trial system, the jury traditionally evaluates cred-
ibility.55 Allowing the trial judge to weigh credibility under rule 403
would invade the jury's province 6 and usurp its function.57 Because the
sixth and seventh amendments secure constitutional rights to jury trial,
empowering a judge to pass on credibility also would raise serious ques-
tions about the constitutionality of rule 403.58 A maxim of statutory
construction holds that a court should prefer an interpretation of a
statute that eliminates any substantial questions about its consti-
tutionality.
59
A narrow interpretation of "probative value" in rule 403 not only
removes concerns about the statute's constitutionality, but also is more
consistent with the statutory scheme of the Federal Rules. A broad in-
terpretation of rule 403 would undermine rules 104, 602, and 901-the
rules that govern preliminary fact-finding procedures. ° Under rule
104(a), a judge cannot pass on the credibility of foundational evidence;
a judge must accept the evidence at face value and inquire only
whether, if believed, the evidence creates a rational, permissive infer-
ence of personal knowledge or authenticity. 1 Rule 104(b) states that
when the fulfillment of a conditional fact determines the logical rele-
vance of certain evidence, the judge decides only whether the proponent
has introduced "evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfill-
ment of the condition."62 Rule 602 applies this procedure to the founda-
tional fact of a witness' personal knowledge, and rule 901(a) states that
the same procedure governs the preliminary fact of the authenticity of
"[d]etermination of credibility of evidence is reserved exclusively for the trier of fact"); Western
Indus. v. Newcor Canada, Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1202 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that "a judge in our
system does not have the right to prevent evidence from getting to the jury merely because he does
not think it deserves to be given much weight"); Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1154
(5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (stating that "[a]lIthough we find the court's skepticism about the test
results understandable in light of Mrs. Eisenhower's testimony, we cannot sanction the type of
credibility choice made by the district court here . . . '[r]ule 403 does not permit exclusion of
evidence because the judge does not find it credible' "); United States v. Thompson, 615 F.2d 329,
332-33 (5th Cir. 1980); Bowden v. McKenna, 600 F.2d 282, 284-85 (1st Cir.) (stating that
"[w]eighing probative value... means probative value with respect to a material fact if the evi-
dence is believed, not the degree the court finds it believable"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979).
55. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5214, at 265.
56. Bowden, 600 F.2d at 284-85.
57. 22 C. WRIGHT & K GRAHm, supra note 9, § 5220, at 306.
58. Id. § 5214, at 266.
59. 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 57.24 (rev. ed. 1984).
60. The proposed New York Evidence Code § 403 is patterned directly after Federal Rule of
Evidence 403. The official comment to the New York provision states that the rule "does not
permit exclusion of evidence because the Court does not find it credible." 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAm, supra note 9, § 5214, at 231 (Supp. 1987).
61. See generally Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury, supra note 14, at 577.
62. Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of
Fact, 43 HARV. L. Rlv. 165, 182 (1929); Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury, supra note 14, at 582.
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evidence. An expansive interpretation of rule 403 would frustrate this
preliminary fact-finding procedure. If the judge can subject all evidence
to rule 403 analysis and rule 403 empowers the judge to consider credi-
bility, the limitations on the judge's role imposed by rules 104, 602, and
901 become meaningless. To reconcile rule 403 with these statutes, rule
403 should be construed narrowly. Thus, the constitutional concerns
and the Federal Rules' statutory framework dictate the conclusion that
the language "probative value" in rule 403 does not permit a judge to
consider the credibility of the source of evidence. In short, rule 403 can-
not serve as a vehicle for resurrecting common-law exclusionary rules
based on doubts about the credibility or reliability of evidence.
III. THE PREJUDICE SIDE OF THE RULE 403 BALANCE: MAY A TRIAL
JUDGE EXCLUDE LOGICALLY RELEVANT EVIDENCE TO FURTHER AN
EXTRINSIC SOCIAL POLICY?
It is relatively easy to demonstrate that rule 403 does not allow the
trial judge to consider the credibility of the source of the item of evi-
dence. The next issue is more troublesome, however. Rule 403 expressly
authorizes a judge to exclude evidence on the ground that the admis-
sion of the evidence might cause "prejudice." 3 Like "probative value,"
"prejudice" is ambiguous. The issue presented is whether "prejudice"
should be construed as empowering a judge to bar relevant evidence in
order to further some extrinsic social policy.
The common-law "legal relevancy" doctrine was the forerunner of
Rule 403.04 Dean Wigmore popularized the doctrine and attempted to
rationalize it.65 The early advocates of the doctrine argued that legal
relevancy required that each item of evidence have "plus value"-pro-
bative worth exceeding bare logical relevance.6 Wigmore rejected that
argument. He argued that the core concept of legal relevancy was bal-
ancing, weighing probative value against certain "auxiliary rules of pro-
bative policy. '67
Suppose that in the above hypothetical 8 the prosecution at-
tempted to introduce evidence that, four years before the murder of
Mr. Wilson, Duncan assaulted a Mr. Grimes, the boyfriend of a woman
in whom Duncan was interested. Although this evidence may be proba-
tive to Duncan's prosecution, its admission would implicate several aux-
.63. FED. R. EVID. 403.
64. Trautman, supra note 39, at 387.
65. Id. at 387 n.8 (citing 1 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 28 (P. Tillers rev. ed. 1983)).
66. Dolan, supra note 36, at 267.
67. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 47, at 73 (citing 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2175 (J. Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961)).
68. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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iliary policies of judicial administration.69 One policy is ensuring that
the jury decides the case on a proper basis. If the jury learns of
Duncan's attack on Mr. Grimes, the jury may infer that Duncan is a
violent person and penalize him for his violent past.7 0 Even if the jurors
have a reasonable doubt about Duncan's guilt, subconsciously they may
be tempted to convict Duncan because of his status as a recidivist. A
conviction on that basis would be improper because the Supreme Court
has held that the eighth amendment forbids a legislature from criminal-
izing a status. 1
Another judicial administration policy directs a court to use its
time efficiently. Rule 403 mentions "waste of time" as a factor that can
warrant the exclusion of relevant evidence.72 The presentation of testi-
mony about Duncan's attack on Mr. Grimes might consume days of
trial time. The admission of this testimony also would implicate an-
other judicial administration policy: A jury should concentrate on the
central, historical issues in a case. Rule 403 states that a judge should
consider whether the proffered evidence will "confus[e] ... the is-
sues. 3 The purpose of Duncan's trial is to determine whether he mur-
dered Mr. Wilson; thus, lengthy testimony about an earlier attack on
Mr. Grimes may distract the jury from the issue of Mr. Wilson's mur-
der. Judicial administration policies such as these can countervail"4
against the probative value of an item of evidence and justify its
exclusion.
As previously stated, modern commentators concur that under
both the common-law legal relevancy doctrine and rule 403, a judge
must balance the probative value of an item of evidence against the
impact of the item's admission on certain policies.71 The pivotal ques-
tion is what policies may the judge consider under rule 403. There is
agreement that a judge may consider judicial administration policies."'
For example, in the hypothetical involving the evidence of Duncan's
earlier assault on Mr. Grimes,77 all the policies discussed relate to the
way in which a trier of fact should decide a case-the trier of fact
should concentrate on the central issues, avoid distractions, and ulti-
mately decide the case on a proper basis. The focus, therefore, is on the
69. See Trautman, supra note 38, at 387.
70. See generally E. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MIScoNUCr EVIDENCE § 1:03 (1984).
71. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
72. FED. R. Evm. 403.
73. Id.
74. Schmertz, supra note 42, at 5.
75. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text; see also Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5
U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 12 (1956); Trautman, supra note 39, at 389-90, 393-94.
76. Trautman, supra note 39, at 387.
77. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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cognitive behavior of the jury during the trial. 8
Although commentators concur that rule 403 allows a judge to con-
sider intrinsic judicial administration policies, a major controversy per-
sists over whether a judge also may consider extrinsic social policies.7 9
May a judge bar relevant evidence on the ground that the admission of
the evidence might deter socially desirable conduct? 80 To illustrate, as-
sume that the police questioned Duncan about Mr. Wilson's killing. As-
sume further that during the questioning Duncan formed the
impression that he was engaged in plea bargaining with the police.
Duncan consequently made an incriminating statement; he believed
that the statement was a quid pro quo for charge concessions. Could a
judge exclude the statement under rule 403 on the theory that the ad-
mission of the statement would prejudice the extrinsic policy of encour-
aging plea bargaining?
There is a plausible case that the judge has that power. Professor
Peter Quint has argued that, in an analogous setting, a judge may con-
sider the impact of the admission of evidence on first amendment activ-
ity outside the courtroom. 1 The evidence in question might be
testimony about ideological speech protected by the first amendment.
The admission of the testimony could have a chilling effect on
the exercise of first amendment rights.82 Citizens might fear that their
otherwise constitutionally protected statements would come back later
to haunt them as evidence in a subsequent trial. 3 For that reason, they
would be deterred from asserting their constitutional rights. Professor
Quint contends that in resolving a legal relevancy objection to testi-
mony about first amendment activity, a judge should consider the effect
of the ruling on expressive conduct outside the courtroom.
Case law lends further support to the position that rule 403 allows
a judge to weigh the effect of the admission of evidence on extrinsic
social policies. Adopting Professor Quint's view, one case holds that,
under rule 403, a judge should consider whether the admission of the
evidence will tend to chill the exercise of first amendment rights." In
another case, -the Justice Department opposed the admission of certain
classified material by arguing that rule 403 requires a judge to consider
78. Gold, supra note 52, at 64.
79. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 47, at 84, 86.
80. Travers, An Essay on the Determination of Relevancy Under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 1977 Amz. ST. L.J. 327, 360.
81. Quint, Toward First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of Evidence: The
Problem of United States v. Rosenberg, 86 YAta L.J. 1622, 1624, 1662 (1977).
82. Id. at 1641.
83. Id. at 1645.
84. United States Football League v. National Football League, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1181
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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the impact that admission of the evidence would have on national se-
curity interests.8 5 Decisions involving collateral matters also suggest
that rule 403 can be used to implement substantive social policies. 6
The collateral source rule holds that when a plaintiff sues for personal
injuries, the defense may not introduce evidence of payments that the
plaintiff has received from sources such as social insurance programs. In
a case decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the Supreme Court held that the legal relevancy doctrine requires that
evidence of collateral source payments be excluded.87 The Court stated
that admitting evidence of the payments "would violate the spirit of the
federal statutes" such as the Federal Employers' Liability Insurance
Act.8 The Court's language implies that the legal relevancy doctrine
allows the judge to consider substantive social policies. The proponents
of a broad reading of rule 403 argue that in each of these cases the
exclusion of the evidence does nothing to enhance a judicial administra-
tion policy. Rather, the stated purpose for exclusion is the pursuit of a
socially desirable objective unrelated to the goal of accurate dispute
resolution.89
Professor Quint's commentary and the case law construing rule 403
strengthen the argument that the term "prejudice" in the rule empow-
ers the judge to consider injury or prejudice to extrinsic social policies.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides additional, analogical support
for that argument. Rule 501 directs that privilege law "shall be gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-
ence."90 Privileges are designed to promote extrinsic policies such as en-
couraging full, frank communication between attorney and client. 1 In
rule 501, Congress expressly authorized the courts to develop privilege
doctrine by common-law process. The broad authorization to create evi-
dentiary doctrines based on extrinsic social concerns under rule 501
makes it more plausible to construe rule 403 as permitting a judge to
consider similar concerns.
Although rule 501 furnishes indirect, analogical support for a broad
reading of rule 403, the most powerful support for this construction is a
statement in the Advisory Committee Note on rule 403. The first para-
85. United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d 1215, 1216, 1220-21 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
judge could not consider the effect on national security), vacated, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985).
86. 1 J. WmNSTEIN & MK BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 403[01], at 403-17 (1986); 22 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5223, at 313-14 n.35 (Supp. 1987).
87. Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253, 255-56 (1963).
88. Id. at 255; see also 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 86, 403[01], at 403-17.
89. Travers, supra note 80, at 328-29.
90. FED. R Evm. 501.
91. E. CLEARY, supra note 3, § 72.
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graph of that Note refers to "[t]he rules which follow this Article
.... ""9 Article IV includes rules 407 through 410. Rule 407 bars evi-
dence of subsequent remedial repairs.93 Rules 40894 and 40911 ordinarily
preclude the admission of statements or payments made incident to
compromise negotiations. Rule 410 similarly announces a general prohi-
bition against the introduction of statements made during plea bargain-
ing.S9 As Professor Arthur Travers has pointed out, these rules rest
primarily on considerations of extrinsic social policy.9 7 The principal ra-
tionale for each rule is to influence positively conduct outside the court-
room by encouraging remedial measures to promote safety, or by
fostering settlement negotiations to ease the burden on the judicial sys-
tem. Professor Travers argues that the Advisory Committee's character-
92. FED. R. Evin. 403 advisory committee's note.
93. Rule 407 reads:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the
event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as prov-
ing ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.
FED. R. EVID. 407.
94. Rule 408 states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability
for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in com-
promise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of
any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compro-
mise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for
another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EvID. 408.
95. Rule 409 provides: "Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, hos-
pital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for the in-
jury." FED. R. Evm. 409.
96. Rule 410 reads:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or
criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant
in the plea discussions: (1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; (2) a plea of nolo
contendere; (3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding either of the
foregoing pleas; or (4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney
for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea
of guilty later withdrawn. However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding
wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been
introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or
(ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the
defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel.
FED. R. Evm. 410.
97. Travers, supra note 80, at 329, 334, 356-60.
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ization of these rules as "concrete applications" of rule 403 is either an
anomalous misstatement or an indication that rule 403 authorizes the
judge to consider extrinsic policies, such as the social concerns inspiring
rules 407 through 410.98 This view suggests that, unless the Committee
misunderstood the statute that it helped to draft, the Committee's Note
seems to permit a judge to factor extrinsic social policies as well as judi-
cial administration concerns into rule 403 balancing.
The three subsections of Part III of this Article analyze the sound-
ness of that conclusion. Subpart III(A) derives a model for rule 403
decisionmaking from the rule's text and legislative history. This subsec-
tion concludes that the model should exclude extrinsic social policy
considerations. Subpart III(B) addresses the argument that rule 501 in-
dicates that it is proper for a judge to weigh extrinsic social policy con-
cerns under rule 403. Subpart III(C) discusses the argument that the
reference to rules 407 through 410 in the Advisory Committee Note to
rule 403 proves that it is appropriate to factor substantive policies into
rule 403 balancing.
A. A Model of Judicial Decisionmaking Under Rule 403
Rule 403 undeniably grants the judiciary some discretionary power.
The decision to grant this power, however, was controversial. In 1942,
when the American Law Institute discussed rule 303 of the proposed
Model Code of Evidence, a statute similar to current rule 403, vigorous
opposition arose to giving the trial bench wide discretion.99 A California
Bar report on rule 303 insisted that "such powers should never be en-
trusted to any judge."100 That opposition resurfaced during Congres-
sional debates over the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.101 The
practicing bar particularly was concerned that rule 403 granted the trial
bench undue power.
10 2
To make rule 403 palatable to the bar, proponents stressed that the
rule gives the bench only a carefully "structured discretion."103 The text
and legislative history of the rule show that Congress intended to limit
the power accorded by the rule. The text of rule 403 lists several factors
that a judge may balance against the probative value of the evidence.
Unlike many lists in article IV of the Federal Rules, the list in rule 403
98. Id. at 363.
99. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M BERGER, supra note 86, 1 403[02], at 403-23.
100. California State Bar, Committee on Administration of Justice, Report on Model Code of
Evidence, 19 CAL. ST. B.J. 262, 270 (1944) (emphasis omitted).
101. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5212, at 252-58.
102. See id. at 257.
103. Id. at 256-57.
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does not begin with the language, "such as."1 °4 On its face, the list pur-
ports to be exhaustive. The legislative history of rules 403 and 404 rein-
forces that conclusion. The third paragraph of the Advisory Committee
Note on rule 403 points out that "[t]he rule does not enumerate sur-
prise as a ground for exclusion .... The Note then states that,
because the text of the rule omits any mention of surprise, the judge
cannot consider surprise in the rule 403 balancing process. 10 6 That
statement would be a non sequitur unless the list in rule 403 is exclu-
sive. Similarly, the Senate Committee Report on rule 404 indicates that
the list in rule 403 is exclusive. The Report points out that if evidence
of a defendant's other crimes (such as Duncan's earlier attack on Mr.
Grimes) otherwise is admissible under federal rule 404(b), "the trial
judge may exclude it only on the basis of those considerations set forth
in Rule 403. . .. ,110 The Report's use of "only" confirms that the list
of factors in rule 403 is exclusive. Therefore, a judge can exclude logi-
cally relevant evidence under rule 403 only on the basis of one of the
listed factors. 0 8
The task then is to define the factors listed in the rule. These fac-
tors should derive their meaning from the legislative purpose that in-
spired the rule. The purpose underlying both the common-law legal
relevancy doctrine and rule 403 is the protection of the integrity of the
fact-finding process.109 The doctrine and the rule are calculated to facil-
itate accurate fact-finding 10 and the search for truth."' The likelihood
of ascertaining the truth is maximized objectively when the trier of fact
uses a logical reasoning process: 112 the jury treats the item of evidence
as proof of the fact that the judge admits the item to prove; the jury
assigns the item the proper weight on that factual proposition; and the
jury resists the temptation to treat the item as probative of another
fact, which the item legitimately cannot be admitted to establish.,1 3
This ideal model of jury decisionmaking helps to define the proba-
tive dangers against which a judge may guard under rule 403. An item
of evidence can be excluded under the rule when its admission realisti-
104. Compare FED. R. EvID. 403 with FED. R. EVID. 404(b), 407-408, 410.
105. FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
106. Id.
107. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 7051, 7071.
108. Travers, supra note 80, at 350.
109. See id. at 360.
110. Dolan, supra note 36, at 284; Gold, supra note 52, at 68; Weinstein & Berger, supra note
47, at 73.
111. See Weinstein & Berger, supra note 47, at 79-80.
112. See generally Gold, supra note 52, at 59.
113. Id. at 73.
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cally would jeopardize logical jury decisionmaking. 114 The item could
distort the fact-finding process1 15 by inducing the jury to err at one of
the steps in its inferential process. 1 6 The judge must attempt to predict
the likely effect of the evidence on the jury's reasoning process."
Drawing on his knowledge of juror psychology, the judge tries to fore-
cast the probable response of the typical juror to the item of
evidence."18
As previously stated, the juror ideally should ascribe to an item of
evidence only the probative value that the item deserves. Suppose, how-
ever, that the judge believes that, realistically, the jury is likely to mis-
estimate and overvalue the probative worth of the item.119 The judge
may fear that the jury will draw a stronger inference than is warranted
from the evidence. 120 Giving the item undue weight would constitute an
inferential error.1 21 For example, it is widely assumed that lay jurors
overestimate the objectivity and certainty of scientific testimony.1
22
Based on this assumption, a danger exists that the jurors would exag-
gerate the importance of any scientific testimony and draw an errone-
ous inference of guilt.12 8 If the defense challenged the admission of that
testimony under rule 403, the judge properly could consider that danger
as a factor cutting against admissibility.
The inferential process also is imperiled when a judge admits evi-
dence that realistically tempts the jury to decide a case on an improper
basis. 1 24 The philosopher Jeremy Bentham called this problem the risk
of "misdecision."'' 25 The Advisory Committee Note to rule 403 states
that the term "[u]nfair prejudice" means "an undue tendency to sug-
114. Id. at 65.
115. Travers, supra note 80, at 328, 335.
116. Gold, supra note 52, at 83.
117. Id. at 68-69.
118. Id. at 69; see also 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAAM, supra note 9, § 5215, at 278.
119. See Gold, supra note 52, at 81; Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021,
1027 (1977); Travers, supra note 80, at 328, 344.
120. Quint, supra note 81, at 1643, 1669 (noting the tendency of a jury to give undue weight
to political views during a trial for espionage).
121. Gold, supra note 52, at 90; see also Lempert, supra note 119, at 1030-31.
122. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that jurors some-
times attribute a "mystic infallibility" to scientific testimony); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 32,
549 P.2d 1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976) (observing that a "misleading aura of certainty
.. . often envelops a new scientific process"); People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 320, 438 P.2d 33,
33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 497 (1968) (stating that mathematics is "a veritable sorcerer in our comput-
erized society" and can "cast a spell" over the trier of fact); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385, 391
A.2d 364, 370 (1978); see also Gold, supra note 52, at 69.
123. Lempert, supra note 119, at 1027; see also Dolan, supra note 36, at 241.
124. Dolan, supra note 36, at 226; see also United States v. 0.161 Acres of Land, 837 F.2d
1036 (11th Cir. 1988).
125. 6 J. BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 105-09 (J. Bowring ed. 1962), cited in
Dolan, supra note 36, at 226.
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gest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily,
an emotional one."12 For example, testimony about Duncan's un-
charged crime, the earlier attack on Mr. Grimes, poses this danger. On
the one hand, testimony about the crime may be relevant for a legiti-
mate purpose, other than to establish a damning character trait.
Duncan may have committed the prior attack with a modus operandi
strikingly similar to the manner in which Wilson was killed; and there-
fore testimony about the attack on Mr. Grimes may be relevant to es-
tablish that Duncan was the killer.127 On the other hand, the same
testimony gives rise to an inference that Duncan has a character trait or
propensity for violence. 28 Unless Duncan places his character in issue,
the prosecution cannot introduce evidence of Duncan's disposition for
violence. Even if the judge gives the jury a limiting instruction that for-
bids consideration of testimony about the earlier assault as character
evidence, the obvious character inference may influence the jury sub-
consciously. 29 The testimony incidentally shows Duncan's violent char-
acter, 30 and, exposed to that information, the jurors may be tempted to
penalize Duncan for his criminal past.
The same type of inferential error explains why and to what extent
first amendment activity should be protected under rule 403. Professor
Quint correctly points out that the typical jury represents majoritarian
interests.'' As previously stated, the judge must attempt, in applying
rule 403, to predict how the typical juror is likely to react to the item of
evidence. 3 2 In making that prediction, the judge can consider the inevi-
table biases of lay jurors. 33 Suppose that the first amendment activity
in question is advocacy of an unpopular political belief or association
with an unpopular political group, such as the Communist Party."3 The
admission of testimony about this type of first amendment activity can
inflame the jury; 3 5 the antipathy against the belief or group may be so
intense that the jury will be inclined to penalize the defendant for en-
tertaining the belief or belonging to the group.3 6 The jury's bias may
126. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note; see also People v. Hoze, 195 Cal. App. 3d
949, 955, 241 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17 (1987).
127. See generally E. IMWINKELR=D, supra note 70, § 3:10.
128. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(1).
129. Recent Case, Criminal Law-Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes, 24 TEMP. L.Q.
245, 246 (1950).
130. Note, Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Offenses in Criminal Prosecutions in West
Virginia, 54 W. VA. L. REv. 142, 144 (1951).
131. Quint, supra note 81, at 1657.
132. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
133. Dolan, supra note 36, at 226.
134. Quint, supra note 81, at 1623.
135. Id. at 1678; see also Dolan, supra note 36, at 239.
136. Quint, supra note 81, at 1645; see also Dolan, supra note 36, at 239.
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tempt the jury to censor the defendant covertly.37 Thus, the testimony
poses a classic danger of misdecision, a verdict on an improper basis. 138
The point is not simply that the admission of the testimony might de-
ter third parties from exercising first amendment rights, but rather that
the admission of the testimony might induce the jury to resolve this
case on an illegitimate basis; that risk, in turn, creates the possibility of
a chilling effect.
The factors listed in rule 403 have an important common denomi-
nator: They all relate to trial concerns. 139 More specifically, the con-
cerns subsumed under the concept of "prejudice" are probative dangers
that threaten to vitiate the fact-finding process itself. 4 ° Each danger
that the jury will overvalue the evidence or draw an improper inference
from the evidence creates the risk of a type of inferential error. Rule
403 implements judicial administration policies by empowering the
judge to exclude evidence that realistically creates these dangers. The
focus of these policies is the behavior of the trier of fact. As the presid-
ing government representative at a trial, the judge has a unique respon-
sibility to supervise that behavior and implement those administra-
tion policies. Those policies provide the framework for rule 403
decisionmaking.
To incorporate extrinsic social policies into the model for decision-
making under rule 403 is both unnecessary and undesirable. No logical
necessity exists to factor extrinsic policies into the model because those
policies are readily distinguishable from the judicial administration pol-
icies discussed above. Some commentators suggest that judicial admin-
istration policies differ only in degree from extrinsic social policies,14'
but that suggestion is unsound. The two types of policies are funda-
137. See Quint, supra note 81, at 1658.
138. This reasoning also furnishes the correct rationale for the Supreme Court's collateral
source decision in Eichel v. New York Central Railroad, 375 U.S. 253 (1963). On close reading, it
becomes clear that in Eichel the Court did not exclude the evidence to implement any extrinsic
social policy. Rather, the Court was concerned about a decision on an improper basis. The Court
noted that as a matter of substantive law, the defendant was not entitled to reduce the plaintiff's
recovery by the amount of the disability payments that the plaintiff had received. Id. at 255. The
defendant argued alternatively that the payments were logically relevant to show that the plaintiff
was overstating his disability; that is, the defendant offered the evidence to establish a motive for
malingering. The Court was willing to assume that there was at least some probative value on that
issue. The Court feared, however, that if the testimony was admitted, the jury would decide the
damages issue on an improper basis and "misuse" the testimony "for the incompetent purpose of a
set-off against lost earnings." Id. (quoting Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 319 F.2d 12, 20 (2d Cir.
1963)). In short, Eichel is explicable even under a narrow interpretation of "prejudice" in rule 403.
139. M GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 403.1, at 179; Schmertz, supra note 42, at 5.
140. Schmertz, supra note 42, at 5.
141. Guernsey, Toward a Unified Approach to Privileges and Relevancy, 17 Mam. ST. UL.
REv. 1, 14 (1986).
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mentally and qualitatively different.142 Extrinsic policies relate to be-
havior outside the courtroom, while judicial administration policies bear
on courtroom decisionmaking. Although the trial judge is peculiarly
well trained and positioned to supervise judicial administration policies,
the judiciary's responsibility for the formulation of extrinsic social pol-
icy is radically different. The judiciary shares that responsibility with
the legislative and the executive branches. In most respects, the legisla-
ture's power to announce extrinsic social policy is plenary. 14 3
Moreover, to incorporate extrinsic policies into the model for rule
403 decisionmaking is undesirable. As previously stated, the purpose of
rule 403 is to facilitate accurate fact-finding.""' Incorporating extrinsic
policy into the model often would frustrate that purpose. Exclusionary
rules premised on extrinsic social policy can lead to the exclusion of
relevant, reliable evidence and can handicap the jury's reasoning pro-
cess. 1 45 In many instances, excluding probative evidence because of an
extrinsic social policy will decrease the probability of finding the truth.
Rule 403 was conceived as a means to the end of correct fact-finding,
and it would be counterproductive to factor extrinsic social policy into
the concept of prejudice in rule 403 decisionmaking.
B. The Argument Based on Federal Rule of Evidence 501
Advocates in favor of an expansive interpretation of "prejudice"
contend that the scope of rule 403 cannot be analyzed solely in terms of
the basic policy underlying the rule. They contend that resolution of
the scope of rule 403 also should take into account federal rule 501 and
the Advisory Committee Note to rule 403, which refers to statutes that
appear to effect extrinsic policies, such as rule 407.
Federal rule 501 provides that witnesses' evidentiary privileges
"shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts . . . in the light of reason and experience. '"146
The privileges rest on extrinsic social policies. For example, the physi-
cian-patient privilege is designed to affect behavior outside the court-
room. The privilege protects the confidentiality of physician-patient
communications in order to encourage patients to make full disclosure
to their physicians, and to enable physicians to diagnose more effec-
tively. According to advocates of a broad interpretation of rule 403, rule
142. Weinberg, The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence, 21 McGLL L.J. 1, 25-
26 (1975).
143. See L. TRME, AMEmcA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 224, 318 (1978); see also J. NOWAK, R
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 4.8 (3d ed. 1986).
144. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
145. Schmertz, supra note 42, at 7.
146. FED. R. Evm. 501.
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501 is proof that Congress was willing to grant to the judiciary some
power to formulate extrinsic policy. They argue that judicial adminis-
tration policies "are very similar to the policies that underpin the justi-
fications for a privilege ...."'17 Because the two types of policies are
so similar, Congress likely intended the concept of "prejudice" in rule
403 to extend to extrinsic policy. Although this contention has some
superficial appeal, it is flawed in the final analysis.
In many jurisdictions this contention cannot be advanced at all.
Although the final version of article V includes only rule 501, which
relegates the courts to common-law privilege doctrine, the original ver-
sion of article V included a detailed set of privileges.'- 8 The majority of
the states adopting a version of the Federal Rules have followed the
original version of article V, which includes specific provisions on privi-
leges such as attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient relation-
ships.149 In these jurisdictions article V "forecloses common-law
development and restricts privileges to those specifically listed in the
rules."150 In short, in a majority of jurisdictions the advocates of a
broad interpretation of rule 403 cannot look to rule 501 for support be-
cause those jurisdictions do not authorize the judiciary to create privi-
leges by common-law process.
In federal practice and in the minority of states that have adopted
the federal version of rule 501, the analogical argument concededly is
available. Even in these jurisdictions, however, the argument is weak.
The original version of article V included nine separate statutes, rules
5-02 through 5-10, which regulated individual privileges.151 The same
original draft included a version of rule 403.5 While Congress ulti-
mately decided against enacting proposed rules 5-02 through 5-10, Con-
gress passed rule 403.1" Significantly, neither Congress nor the states
147. Guernsey, supra note 141, at 15.
148. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 243-82 (1969).
149. 1 G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 6, § 23.2, at 2-3. Seventeen states have enacted
a version of article V. Id.
150. Id.
151. Preliminary Draft, 46 F.R.D. at 248-79.
152. Id. at 225.
153. Although the wording of the final version of rule 403 differs somewhat from the original
version of the rule, the listing of the factors to be balanced against probative value is identical in
both versions. In particular, both versions employ the expression "unfair prejudice." Proposed
Rule 4-03 reads:
(a) Exclusion mandatory. Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of
misleading the jury.
(b) Exclusion Discretionary. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
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adopting Congress' version of rule 501 felt compelled to broaden rule
403 in light of their decision to delete proposed rules 5-02 through 5-10.
The legislative history of rule 501 both in Congress and in the states
adopting Congress' version of rule 501 discloses no indication that Con-
gress intended rule 501 to have any impact whatsoever on the scope of
rule 403. The plain inference is that, in the legislators' minds, the rule's
scope remained the same after the enactment of rule 501. If so, courts
should interpret the scope of rule 403 as if rule 501 did not authorize
resort to common-law process. The advocates of a broad scope for rule
403 may think that rule 501's reference to the judges' common-law
power furnishes some insight into the scope of rule 403, but the legisla-
tors who passed rule 501 apparently thought otherwise.
The very nature of the extrinsic policy that underlies evidentiary
privileges further weakens the analogy between the policies protected
by rule 403 and the policies that the judiciary can implement under
rule 501. Traditional evidentiary privileges rest on a single, narrow ex-
trinsic policy: The protection of confidential relations. In describing the
requisites for recognition of a privilege, Dean Wigmore declared that
any asserted privilege must serve to protect the confidentiality of a vital
social "relation. . .which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.' 154 That policy is so limited that it cannot rational-
ize other provisions in article IV that are based to some extent on ex-
trinsic policy. For example, recall that rule 407 bars evidence of
subsequent remedial measures. The Advisory Committee Note makes it
clear that the extrinsic policy rationale of rule 407 is to remove a disin-
centive for safety precautions.155 By no stretch of the imagination can
rule 407 be explained as a protective measure for a confidential rela-
tionship. The policy that underlies evidentiary privileges under article
V bears little resemblance to the extrinsic policies promoted by some of
the article IV provisions. This lack of resemblance makes it frivolous to
argue that rule 501 justifies incorporation of extrinsic policies into rule
403 decisionmaking.
C. The Argument Based on the Advisory Committee Note to
Federal Rule of Evidence 403
As noted in the preceding subsection, the promotion of extrinsic
social policies explains some of the provisions in article IV. Thus, the
provisions of article IV cannot be explained exclusively in terms of judi-
Id.
154. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (J. McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
155. FED. R. EvD. 407 advisory committee's note.
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cial administration policies. Further, the Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 403 refers to other provisions in article IV and characterizes them
as "concrete applications" of rule 403.156 If the other provisions of arti-
cle IV address extrinsic policy concerns and if those provisions re-
present applications of rule 403, it appears that rule 403 should be
construed as addressing those concerns. More specifically, as the propo-
nents of a broad reading of rule 403 claim, "prejudice" in rule 403
should be interpreted to include damage to extrinsic social policy. This
argument, however, like the proponents' contention based on rule 501,
is fallacious.
To be sure, the argument contains an element of truth. Professor
Travers correctly points out that rules like rule 407 implement extrinsic
social policies,5 7 and in that respect those rules are akin to privileges.
158
Some commentators refer to these rules as "quasi-privilege[s]."' '59 The
argument, however, rests on an incomplete understanding of the rules.
The argument fails to recognize that these rules also are explicable par-
tially in terms of the judicial administration policies previously dis-
cussed. 160 There is nothing anomalous about the Advisory Committee's
statement that the rules are "concrete applications" of rule 403.161 Even
if the term "prejudice" in rule 403 is interpreted narrowly, the state-
ment is demonstrably correct.
One can demonstrate most easily the application of the Advisory
Committee's statement to rule 411, which lays out the general rule ex-
cluding evidence of liability insurance."8 2 To a limited extent, rule 411
promotes an extrinsic social policy. 63 If evidence of liability insurance
routinely were admissible against tort defendants, its admissibility
might create a disincentive to obtaining insurance. Citizens who main-
tain liability insurance serve the public's interest by ensuring that any
just claim will be paid. The principal raison d'etre for rule 411, how-
ever, is a judicial administration policy.'" As the Advisory Committee
Note to the rule states, disclosure of a defendant's liability insurance
during trial could "induce juries to decide cases on improper
grounds."'" 5 Using "deep pocket" reasoning, 166 a jury might be tempted
156. FED. R. EviD. 403 advisory committee's note.
157. Travers, supra note 80, at 362.
158. 2 D. LOuiSELL & C. MULLER, supra note 53, § 163, at 376 (pointing out that Dean
McCormick noted the "functional relationship" between such rules and evidentiary privileges).
159. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5213, at 262.
160. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
161. FED. R Evm. 403 advisory committee's note.
162. FED. R. EvlD. 411.
163. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 86, 411[02], at 411-17.
164. Id. at 411-15.
165. FED. R. Evm. 411 advisory committee's note.
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to return a verdict for the plaintiff in order to shift the loss to the in-
surer.1 7 A jury's awareness of the defendant's insured status might also
result in excessive damages because the jury realizes that damages will
not come out of the pocket of the individual defendant.168 In short, rule
411 is a classic illustration of one of the inferential errors that rule 403
empowers the judge to guard against: The jury's misusing an item of
evidence and deciding an issue in the case on an improper basis.
The other type of inferential error against which rule 403 guards is
exaggeration of the probative value of the evidence. The other provi-
sions in article IV, rules 407 through 410, are explicable in terms of that
inferential error. Rule 407 announces the general proposition that evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures is inadmissible."6 9 As with rule
411, rule 407 effects an extrinsic social policy.170 Encouraging precau-
tionary measures by manufacturers and landowners furthers society's
interest.117 The routine admissibility of testimony about remedial steps
might discourage manufacturers and landowners from taking those
steps.172 That extrinsic social policy, however, is not the exclusive justi-
fication for rule 407. The Advisory Committee Note to rule 407 states
explicitly that the rule "rests on two grounds."'"" The other ground for
the rule is that the jury may overvalue the probative worth of evidence
of a subsequent repair.17 4 The issue in these cases is the antecedent
negligence or culpable conduct of the defendant. On that issue, the pro-
bative value of evidence of a later precautionary measure is often
weak 7 5 because the inference of earlier fault is tenuous. 76 Before adop-
tion of the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
ban on evidence of subsequent repairs rests in part on this relevance
rationale.17 7 The draftsmen of the state versions of rule 407 in Oregon
and New York also recognized that one of the bases for the rule is the
fear that a jury will exaggerate the probative value of the evidence.178
166. Schmertz, supra note 42, at 19.
167. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5362, at 429 (quoting from E. MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 212 (1961)).
168. Slough, supra note 75, at 15.
169. FED. R. EvID. 407.
170. Travers, supra note 80, at 358-59.
171. Trautman, supra note 39, at 394.
172. Travers, supra note 80, at 357-58.
173. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
174. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 53, § 164, at 382.
175. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 266 (4th ed. 1986); see
also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 86, 1 407[02], at 407-10.
176. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 175, at 267.
177. Columbia & P.S. Ry. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892); see also 23 C. WRIGHT &
K GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5282, at 92-93.
178. 23 C. WRIGHT & K GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5282, at 17 n.21 (Supp. 1987).
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Like rule 411, rule 407 is a "concrete application" of rule 403 because
rule 407 rests in part on the rationale of preventing inferential error.
Rules 408 and 409 exhibit the same pattern. Rule 408 provides that
compromise offers and accompanying statements cannot be used "to
prove liability for or invalidity of the claim . ". .. ,I" Rule 409 extends a
similar prohibition to evidence of payments for medical expenses.18 0
Like rules 407 and 411, these two rules are based partially on extrinsic
social policy. Rule 408 implements the "sensible"1 s social policy
i82 of
encouraging out-of-court settlements. Rule 409 also serves a social pol-
icy:183 A potential defendant may act as a Good Samaritan and cover an
injured party's medical expenses even when the potential defendant
does not believe that he was at fault in causing the accident. Such pay-
ments are certainly to be encouraged. Admitting evidence of these pay-
ments, however, might deter the Good Samaritan because a jury might
misconstrue the payments as an admission of liability in a subsequent
trial.
Although rules 408 and 409 indisputably effect extrinsic social poli-
cies, social policy is not the sole rationale for the rules. The Advisory
Committee Note to rule 408 states that the rule is "based on two
grounds,1 84 and the Note to rule 409 declares that that rule rests on
"parallel" considerations.185 Dean Wigmore,'8 6 the drafters of the pro-
posed New York Evidence Code,187 and recent cases 8 8 recognize that
the alternative basis for the rules which exclude compromise statements
and humanitarian payments is relevancy. The vast majority of civil
cases settle. 89 Parties to most civil claims reach a compromise before a
suit is filed. 90 Pretrial discovery is so expensive1 91 and the outcome of
trial is so uncertain that even parties who are firmly convinced of the
merit of their litigation position may attempt to settle before trial. A
grave risk exists that the jury will overestimate the probative value of
compromise statements. The average juror might view the party's will-
179. FED. R. EviD. 408.
180. FED. R. Evm. 409.
181. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 86, 408[02], at 408-20.
182. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 53, § 170, at 443, § 171, at 452.
183. 2 J. WEINsTIN & M. BERGER, supra note 86, 409[01], at 409-13.
184. FED. R. Evm. 408 advisory committee's note.
185. FED. R. EvD. 409 advisory committee's note.
186. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 86, 1 408[02], at 408-16 to -17 (quoting 4 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1061, at 28-29 (3d ed. 1940)).
187. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5302, at 43 n.46 (Supp. 1987).
188. See, e.g., Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215 (Iowa 1984).
189. Kelner, Settlement Techniques-Part One, 16 TRL 39 (Feb. 1980).
190. Id.
191. See generally Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers
About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 219, 223.
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ingness to settle as an implicit admission of weakness in the party's
litigation position, especially if the juror has never been involved in liti-
gation before. 1 2 Although the party's willingness to settle is ambiguous
evidence of the weakness of the party's litigation position, the inference
from that willingness is treacherous.19 3 In short, as with rules 407 and
411, rules 408 and 409 are based partially on one of the inferential er-
rors subsumed under the concept of "prejudice."
The final rule invoked by the proponents of a broad reading of rule
403 is rule 410. That rule usually precludes the prosecution from intro-
ducing statements made by a defendant during plea bargaining with a
prosecuting attorney.194 Like the other rules cited by the proponents,
rule 410 implements an extrinsic social policy. 195 Just as the Federal
Rules should encourage the out-of-court settlement of civil cases, they
also should encourage plea bargaining. The criminal justice system is
overburdened. The widespread practice of plea bargaining eases the
burden on the system and makes it possible to dispose of the cases that
do go to trial within a constitutionally permissible period. 9 ' As one
commentator stated bluntly, in most jurisdictions prosecutors "must
[plea bargain] in order to stay in business.'
97
Advocates of an expansive interpretation of rule 403, however,
often fail to recognize that rule 410 is based partially on the judicial
administration policy of preventing inferential error by the trier of fact.
If the typical juror learns that a defendant has offered to plead guilty,
the juror almost invariably will treat the offer as strong evidence of
guilt. 98 A juror is likely to view the offer as a type of confession. As in
the case of attempts to settle civil claims, a juror may overvalue the
evidence.' 99 An innocent defendant may be willing to plead guilty.
200
The Supreme Court has ruled that "[a]n individual accused of crime
may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposi-
tion of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his
participation in the acts constituting the crime." 0' The Court has ac-
knowledged that a guilty plea can be the most intelligent tactical option
192. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAm, supra note 9, § 5322, at 298.
193. Id.
194. FED. R. EvID. 410.
195. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 86, 410[01], at 410-24 to -43.
196. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a speedy trial. U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
197. Polstein, How to "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PRAC. LAW. 35, 37 (1962).
198. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & h BERGER, supra note 86, 410101], at 410-25.
199. Id.
200. Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in THE PRSSmENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPOR. THE COURTS 108, 112-14 app. A
(1967).
201. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
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for an innocent defendant when the evidence against him is strong and
the maximum punishment is severe. 02 In other cases, a defendant may
offer to plead guilty to protect a loved one whom he believes to have
committed the crime. Just as a civil defendant's offer to settle may be
motivated by many reasons other than the validity of the plaintiff's
claim, a criminal defendant's expressed interest in plea bargaining may
be prompted by motivations other than his guilt of the charged crime.
In short, rule 410 rests on relevancy grounds as well as policy
grounds. 03
The Advisory Committee's statement that rules 407 through 411
are concrete applications of rule 403 can be understood properly in this
light. Even narrowly interpreted, rule 403 empowers the trial judge to
shield the jury from evidence likely to cause an inferential error. The
error could arise from either overvaluing the probative weight of the
evidence or misusing the evidence and deciding the case on an improper
basis. While rules 407 through 411 all implement extrinsic social poli-
cies to some extent, they have another common denominator: They are
designed to guard against inferential error by the jury. In this sense, the
Advisory Committee was correct in characterizing rules 407 through 411
as "concrete applications" of the probative dangers listed in rule 403.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, rule 403 does not authorize a judge to exclude rele-
vant evidence because he either doubts the credibility of the source of
the evidence or wishes to promote an extrinsic social policy. The ex-
pression "probative value" in rule 403 empowers a judge to consider the
facial definiteness of the evidence, the length of the chain of inferences,
and the strength of those inferences. A judge can evaluate all those fac-
tors without usurping the jury's power to assess credibility. In the same
vein, the term "prejudice" in the rule should be read narrowly. The
concept of prejudice permits a judge to safeguard the integrity of the
fact-finding process. A judge does so by shielding the jury from techni-
cally relevant evidence that threatens to prompt inferential error by the
trier of fact. Expanding the notion of prejudice to include damage to
extrinsic social policies would distort the concept, because that broad
interpretation would deny the jury evidence that it is likely to value
correctly and use properly. Depriving the jury of that type of evidence
would undermine rather than enhance the accuracy of fact-finding.
The stakes involved in the dispute over the scope of rule 403 are
critical. One of the stakes is the future of rule 403. Rule 403 has been
202. Id.
203. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & h. BERGER, supra note 86, T 410[01], at 410-24 (1986).
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called a cornerstone of the Federal Rules. 2 4 After reviewing the legisla-
tive history of the rule, courts have concluded almost uniformly that
Congress viewed exclusion of relevant evidence under the rule as an ex-
ceptional, 0 5 extraordinary 2°6 remedy. Congress intended that judges
would invoke this drastic remedy sparingly207 and infrequently. 08 An
expansive reading of rule 403 would violate that intent. If "probative
value" is interpreted to include credibility, or if "prejudice" is con-
strued to include injury to an extrinsic social policy, rule 403 will lead
to the exclusion of relevant evidence in far more cases than Congress
contemplated. The frequent exclusion of evidence under rule 403 would
be a misuse of the rule20 9 and an affront to the legislative intent under-
lying the rule.
Furthermore, a broad interpretation of rule 403 would imperil the
future of the Federal Rules as a comprehensive evidence code.2 10 The
Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Abel 21' and Bourjaily v.
United States212 demonstrate that the rules should function very much
like a self-contained, civil-law code.2 13 As the Supreme Court noted in
Abel, "[i]n principle, under the Federal Rules no common law of evi-
dence remains. ' 21 4 A broad interpretation of "probative value" or
"prejudice" in rule 403 would in effect allow the courts to revive many
of the common-law rules omitted from the Federal Rules.21 5 Rule 403 is
204. Peterfreund, Relevancy and Its Limits in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts: Article IV, 25 REc. N.Y. CITY BA 80, 83 (1970) (this characteriza-
tion was made when rule 403 was the proposed rule 4-03).
205. See United States v. Blanton, 793 F.2d 1553, 1564 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
678 (1986); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 52, § 125, at 13 (Supp. 1987).
206. See United States v. Caldwell, 820 F.2d 1395 (5th Cir. 1987); Dartez v. Fibreboard
Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 89 (1986); United States v. Betancourt,
734 F.2d 750 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021 (1984); United States v. Pirollo, 673 F.2d
1200, 1203 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 871 (1982); 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
86, T 403[01], at 403-9 n.6 (1986).
207. See United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583, 585 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
338 (1987); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1506 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
961 (1987); United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 766 (11th Cir. 1985); Ebanks v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 688 F.2d 716 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983); United States v.
McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979); M. GRAHAM, supra note 44,
§ 403.1, at 14 (1987 Supp.); 2 D. LouIsELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 52, § 125, at 18 (1985);
Weinstein & Berger, supra note 47, at 79.
208. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 47, at 86; 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 86, 403[02], at 403-27.
209. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5223, at 315.
210. Travers, supra note 80, at 361.
211. 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
212. 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
213. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402, supra note 14, at 129; see also supra notes
15-26 and accompanying text.
214. Abel, 469 U.S. at 51 (quoting Cleary, supra note 21, at 915).
215. 22 C. WRIGHT & K GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5223, at 318. According to the drafters of
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not a magic solvent for all evidentiary problems.2 1 Widening the scope
of rule 403 would defeat the statutory scheme of the Federal Rules.
Finally, and most importantly, a broad reading of rule 403 would
expand undesirably judicial power at the expense of both the jury and
the legislature. One of the leading modern commentators on procedure,
Professor Stephen Saltzburg, has documented convincingly the danger-
ous trend toward the unnecessary expansion of the trial judge's author-
ity. 17 A broad interpretation of rule 403 would exacerbate that trend
and give the judiciary a potent license with which to justify its author-
ity.218 When a judge bars probative evidence because of the judge's own
doubt about the credibility of the source of the evidence, the judge ar-
rogates the jury's authority. Likewise, when a judge excludes relevant
evidence to promote an extrinsic social policy other than the policies
inspiring an evidentiary privilege, the judge encroaches on the legisla-
tive function of formulating extrinsic policy. Under our democratic phi-
losophy, the legislator is directly accountable to the community, and
jurors serve at trials in part because they bring community values to
bear on the process of dispute resolution.2 19 We may not share Lord
Camden's pessimistic view of judicial discretion,2 2 0 but apologists for
Jacksonian democracy 221 have forced us to realize that to expand the
judge's power at the expense of either the juror or the legislator has
profound political implications.222 These implications, the legislative
history of rule 403, and the comprehensive statutory scheme of the Fed-
eral Rules all point to the same conclusion: Congress never intended
rule 403 to be construed as a panacea for all evidentiary ills. The com-
mon law of evidence is dead, and rule 403 cannot be used to resurrect
it.
the New Jersey Code, a revival of common-law rules omitted from the Federal Rules is not a
legitimate role for the judiciary under rule 403. NEw JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT COMM'N, REPORT ON
EVIDENCE 86 (1963); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5223, at 318 n.18.
216. Id. § 5223, at 316.
217. Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1978).
218. Gold, supra note 52, at 61.
219. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GRo. L.J. 395, 403 (1985).
220. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
221. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5052, at 251; Imwinkelried, Judge Versus
Jury, supra note 14, at 585-86.
222. See generally Kaus, All Power to the Jury-California's Democratic Evidence Code, 4
Loy. LA.L. REV. 233 (1971).
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